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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEVEN D. CALDWELL, : RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR 
: REHEARING 
APPELLANT, : 
vs. : 
: Court of Appeals 
: Docket No. 970239 - CA 
LAUREL W. CALDWELL AND : 
NELDA WALL, : 
APPELLEES, 
Appellees respond as follows to the Order of this Court dated March 18, 1998 directing 
them to respond to Issues II and III of the Petition for Rehearing: 
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The Court should deny appellant's Petition For Rehearing. The Complaint of 
appellees for renew the judgments and/or orders contained in the Decree of Divorce 
was not facially deficient. Further, where he has been so callous in his disregard of 
that Court's orders and processes in the divorce action appellant should not be allowed 
on the basis of his own self serving statements only to come back into the courts of this 
State and mount a collateral attack to an order of the court. 
n. 
THE COURT'S DECISION DOES NOT IGNORE DEFENDANT'S 
ANALYSIS OF RULE 54(c)(2) ISSUES 
Appellant Steven D. Caldwell argues that this Court's decision on appeal 
ignores his Arguments that the order of the Court below renewing the judgment did 
not comply with Rule 54(c)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. He charges the 
Court's statement that he did not cite authority for his arguments is erroneous and 
asserts again that Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593, 194 UAR 60 (Utah App. 1992) is 
authority for his argument. However, the Stevens case does not deal with what 
appellant argues as a Rule 54(c)(2) issue. It is not about a judgment varying from that 
strictly prayed for in the complaint as appellant is arguing here. Stevens v. Collard did 
not even deal with the renewal of a judgment, but dealt with whether the allegations of 
the complaint could support a judgment that there had been a substantial change of 
circumstances which justified a change of custody of minor children previously 
awarded in a divorce action. The Court in Stevens held that the complaint did not set 
forth sufficient facts to support the change of custody by default ordered by the court 
2 
below. 
In the case now before the Court the complaint clearly alleges that a decree of 
divorce had been entered by the Court below and sought a renewal of the judgments or 
orders in the decree. The facts that a judgment or order to pay money has been entered 
and is outstanding and is about to expire are the alleging of sufficient facts to support 
an order renewing the judgment. The Stevens case is inapposite to the issues argued by 
appellant. Rather appellant's argument is that the renewal of the judgment with regard 
to the order in the Decree that he pay a sum certain toward a second mortgage held by 
Hal E. Wall is different than that prayed for in the demand for judgment. However, 
the judgment or order renewed is the same order that he pay the same principal sum of 
$10,069.00 together with accrued interest at the legal judgment rate; something he had 
been successful in evading since the entry of the Decree of Divorce. The only and 
slight variance is that the court below ordered him to pay the amount to Nelda Wall the 
surviving spouse and heir of Hal E. Wall since appellant had evaded payment for 
several years until after Hal E. Wall had deceased. The pleadings clearly alerted him 
that a renewal of the judgment was being sought for the estate of Hal E. Wall. Is a 
judgment in the name of Nelda Wall, surviving spouse and heir of Hal E. Wall really 
any different. 
The question is whether he is paying a different judgment? He is not. Or 
whether he is ordered to pay more than the amount of the judgment? He is not. It is 
the same. As noted in the Court's order, appellant cites no authority that opposing the 
Court's decision on appeal. His only authority is his own construction of the 
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provisions of Rule 54(c). He argues that it varies in kind from that prayed in the 
complaint. It does not. Does the judgment order him to pay a debt that he was not 
lawfully ordered to pay in the Decree? It does not. Does the order renewing the 
judgment or order of the Decree change the character of the order in the Decree? It 
does not. He is still ordered to pay the sum of $10,069.00 toward the second mortgage 
held in the name of Hal E. Wall, but is now ordered to pay it to Nelda Wall because 
Hal is deceased. 
Appellant argues that Nelda Wall was not a party to the divorce action. That is 
true, but neither was Hal E. Wall. Yet the Decree ordered him to pay the amount 
specified on the mortgage to Hal E. Wall just as many divorce decrees orders one of 
more of the parties to pay indebtedness to creditors. It did not order him to pay it to 
the plaintiff, Laurel Caldwell. Further Laurel Caldwell was a party to the renewal 
action and contrary to the contentions of the appellant is a party to this appeal. She has 
an interest in his paying the mortgage because she is jointly liable on the mortgage. If 
Nelda Wall is improperly listed as a party it does not defeat the renewal of the 
judgment because Laurel Caldwell, the plaintiff, was and is a party. 
As a practical matter, should the heir to the estate of Hal E Wall have to go to 
considerable additional expense, in addition to costs of collection, just to collect the 
debt the defendant was ordered to pay and has been successful in avoiding for several 
years even until after the death of Mr. Wall? Does the broad purpose and application 
of Rule 54(c)(2) allow for such practicalities where the judgment debtor is not 
prejudiced and is not required to pay anything but what he was required to pay from 
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the original order? Appellees submit that it does. 
How then is the appellant prejudiced? Where is his standing to complain? He 
is only being required to pay what the Decree initially ordered him to pay and nothing 
more. Further, he did not to come to Court when he was served. He was absent when 
he should have been there to contest the proceedings. His self serving contention that 
he did not get notice is of no avail and is unbelievable. He complains that Nelda Wall 
is not a party to the divorce proceedings. However, the complaint for renewal of the 
judgments in the Decree clearly has Nelda Wall as a Party. He could have appeared 
and objected to it before an order was issued, but he did not. From his complete 
indifference to the Court's orders in the divorce action after he moved out of the state, 
the court below was well justified to infer that he chose to stay away. It was the same 
pattern of conduct as his conduct in the divorce case. 
in 
THE COURT'S DECISION DOES NOT IGNORE THE ISSUES 
RAISED BY THE STEVENS V. COLLARD DECISION 
Appellant's third argument in his motion for rehearing is answered by the 
previous arguments of appellees. Stevens v. Collard, goes to the issue of whether the 
allegations of the complaint are adequate upon which to base the default judgment. In 
this case appellant had adequate notice and the complaint clearly alleged that the 
appellees were seeking to renew the judgment or or Order in the Decree that the 
appellant pay the ordered amount toward the second mortgage. If Stevens v. Collard is 
applicable at all, the order below does not offend its holding. 
CONCLUSION 
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The Court should reject and deny appellant's motion for rehearing or for 
reconsideration. He did not come to Court and complain about the form of the 
complaint or the relief sought in a timely manner. He ignored the processes of the 
court below until he was caught with enforcement of its order. The Court should not 
give any more deference now to his requests than he gave to the processes of the Court 
at the time of the service of process. 
In the alternative if the Court determines the issuance of the renewal in the 
name of Nelda Wall is inappropriate, the Court should remand the case to the court 
below to reform the judgment. Finally should the Court determine that the complaint 
did not properly plead the renewal of the Decree, the case should be remanded to the 
court below to consider the appellees' motion to amend the complaint. Now that the 
Court finally has the attention of the appellant, it would not be a just or proper remedy 
to simply vacate the order of the Court below with nothing more as appellant asks this 
Court to do. _ _ 
Respectfully submitted this/^day oi/^^^C^. 1998. 
Delano S. Findlay 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I [ ] delivered, [X] mailed first class, postage prepaid, two true 
and correct copy of the forgoing Response To Petition for Rehearing to the following 
this //{lay of //,,':,( 1998: 
Stephen G. Homer 
Attorney At law 
9225 Soyth Redwood Road 
Salt Lajfe City, UT 84088 
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